The formal system of intuitionistic epistemic logic IEL was proposed by S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu. It provides the formal foundation for the study of knowledge from an intuitionistic point of view based on Brouwer-Hayting-Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionism. We construct a cut-free sequent calculus for IEL and establish that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search in it. So, we prove that IEL is PSPACEcomplete.
Introduction
Modal logic IEL, the basic Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, was proposed by S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu in [1] . It was defined by the following calculus.
Axioms:
• Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic
• F → KF (co-reflection)
• ¬K⊥ (consistency)
Rule: F, F → G ⊢ G (Modus Ponens)
Here knowledge modality K means verified truth, as suggested by T. Williamson in [2] . According to the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionistic logic, a proposition is true iff it is proved. The co-reflection principle states that any such proof can be verified.
The intuitionistic meaning of implication provides an effective proof checking procedure that produces a proof of KF given a proof of F . But the assumption that its output always contains a proof of F is too restrictive. The procedure may involve some trusted sources which do not necessarily produce explicit proofs of what they verify 1 . So the backward implication which is the reflection principle KF → F used in the classical epistemic logic (see [3] ) is wrong in the intuitionistic setting. In general, a proof of KF is less informative than a proof of F .
At the same time some instances of the reflection principle are true in IEL. In particular, it is the consistency principle which is equivalent to K⊥ → ⊥. The proof of K⊥ contains the same information as the proof of ⊥ because there is no such proof at all. The more general example is the reflection principle for negative formulas: K¬F → ¬F . It is provable in IEL (see [1] ).
In this paper we develop the proof theory for IEL. Our main contributions are the cut-free sequent formulation and the complexity bound for this logic. It is established that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search, so IEL is PSPACE-complete.
Our cut-elimination technique is syntactic (see [4] ). We formulate a special cut-free sequent calculus IEL − G without structural rules (see Section 3) that is correct with respect to the natural translation into IEL. It has a specific Kintroduction rule (KI 1 ) that also allows to contract a formula F in the presence of KF in antecedents. This choice makes it possible to prove the admissibility of the standard contraction rule as well as the admissibility of all natural IELcorrect modal rules (Sections 4, 5). The admissibility of the cut-rule is proved by the usual induction on the cutrank (Section 6). As the result we obtain the equivalence between IEL 
It is equivalent to IEL − G . The proof search for IEL can be reduced to the case of so-called minimal derivations (Section 7). We implement it as a game of polynomial complexity and use the characterization AP=PSPACE (see [5] ) to prove the upper complexity bound for IEL. The matching lower bound follows from the same bound for intuitionistic propositional logic [6] .
Sequent formulation of IEL
The definition of intuitionistic sequents is standard (see [4] ). Formulas are build from propositional variables and ⊥ using ∧, ∨, → and K; ¬F means F → ⊥. A sequent has the form Γ ⇒ F where F is a formula and Γ is a multiset of formulas. K(Γ) denotes KF 1 , . . . , KF n when Γ = F 1 , . . . , F n .
Let IEL 0 G be the extension of the intuitionistic propositional sequent calculus (e.g. the propositional part of G2i from [4] with the cut-rule) by the following modal rules:
Comment. IEL 0 G is a straightforwardly formulated sequent counterpart of IEL. Instead of the K-contraction rule (KC) one can take the equivalent Kelimination rule:
Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivations.
Our goal is to eliminate the cut-rule. But the cut-elimination result for IEL 0 G
will not have the desirable consequences, namely, the subformula property and termination of the proof search procedure. Below we give a different formulation without these disadvantages. Rules:
In the rule (KI 1 ) we additionally require that Γ does not contain formulas of the form KG. (This requirement is unessential, see Corollary 4.2.)
We define the main (occurrences of) formulas for axioms and for all inference rules except (KI 1 ) as usual -they are the displayed formulas in the conclusions (not members of Γ, H). For the rule (KI 1 ) all members of K(∆) and the formula KF are main.
Comment. In IEL − G we do not add (KE) or (KC), but modify (KI 0 ). In the presence of weakening (it is admissible, see Lemma 4.1) (KI 0 ) is derivable:
So one can derive all sequents of the forms F ⇒ F for complex F and F ⇒ KF . The latter also requires weakening in the case of F = KG:
Comment. (U ) is necessary. There is no way to prove the sequent K⊥ ⇒ ⊥ without it.
Structural rules are admissible
We prove the admissibility of depth-preserving weakening and depth-preserving contraction. Our proof follows [4] except the case of the rule (KI 1 ). The corresponding inductive step in the proof of Lemma 4.5 does not require the inversion of the rule. Instead of it, some kind of contraction is build in the rule itself.
We write ⊢ n Γ ⇒ F for "Γ ⇒ F has a IEL − G -proof of depth at most n".
Proof. Induction on n, see [4] . 
Proof. It is sufficient to prove sequents Γ, ⊥ ⇒ F and Γ, K⊥ ⇒ F :
Lemma 4.4 (Inversion lemma [4] ) Left rules are invertible in the following sense:
Proof. Induction on n. Case n = 1. When the first sequent is an axiom, the second one is an axiom too. Case n + 1. When the displayed two occurrences of F in Γ, F, F ⇒ G are not main for the last rule of the derivation, apply the induction hypothesis to the premises of the rule and contract F there.
Suppose one of the occurrences is main. Only axioms may have atomic main formulas, so we treat atomic F as in case n = 1.
When F has one of the forms A ∧ B, A ∨ B or A → B, we use the same proof as in [4] . It is based on the items of Inversion lemma formulated in Lemma 4.4.
Case F = KA is new. The derivation of Γ, F, F ⇒ G of depth n + 1 has the form D
where Γ, F, F = Γ ′ , K(∆) and G = KB; the multiset ∆ contains two copies of A. We have
Let ( ) − means to remove one copy of A from a multiset. We apply the induction hypothesis to (1) and obtain ⊢ n Γ,
Admissible modal rules
We have already seen that (KI 0 ) is admissible in IEL − G .
Proof. Induction on n. Case n = 1. When the first sequent is an axiom, the second one is an axiom too. Case n + 1. Consider a proof of depth n + 1 of a sequent Γ, KF ⇒ G. Let (R) be its last rule. When the displayed occurrence of KF is not main for (R), apply the induction hypothesis to its premises and then apply (R) to reduced premises. It will give ⊢ n Γ, F ⇒ G.
Suppose the occurrence of KF is main. The derivation has the form
Apply the induction hypothesis to the premise and remove one copy of F . By Lemma 4.5 ,
Then apply an instance of (KI ext ) with Γ 1 = Γ ′ , F and empty Γ 2 . By Corollary 4.2 ,
Proof. Apply (KE) and contraction. Both rules are admissible and preserve the depth (Lemmas 5.1, 4.5).
Cut is admissible
Consider an IEL − G -derivation with additional cut-rule
and some instance of (Cut) in it. The level of the cut is the sum of the depths of its premises. The rank of the cut is the length of F .
Lemma 6.1 Suppose the premises of (Cut) are provable in IEL − G without (Cut). Then the conclusion is also provable in IEL − G without (Cut).
Proof. We define the following well-ordering on pairs of natural numbers:
As in [4] , we consider three possibilities: I. One of the premises is an axiom. In this case the cut-rule can be eliminated. If the left premise of (2) is an axiom,
then (Cut) is unnecessary. The conclusion can be derived from the right premise by weakening (Lemma 4.1). Now suppose that the right premise is an axiom. If the cutformula F is not main for the axiom Γ 2 , F ⇒ G then the conclusion Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ G is also an axiom, so (Cut) can be eliminated. If F is main for the right premise then F = G = A where A is atomic, so (2) has the form
The conclusion can be derived without (Cut) from the left premise by weakening (Lemma 4.1). II. Both premises are not axioms and the cutformula is not main for the last rule in the derivation of at least one of the premises. In this case one can permute the cut upward and reduce the level of the cut. The cutformula remains the same, so the cut rule can be eliminated by induction hypothesis (see [4] ).
III. The cutformula F is main for the last rules in the derivations of both premises. In this case we reduce the rank of cut and apply the induction hypothesis.
Note that F is not atomic. (The atomic case is considered in I.) If the last rule in the derivation of the left premise is (U ) then (Cut) can be eliminated:
Case F = KA, the last rule in the derivation of the left premise is (KI 1 ):
A ⇒ B and then reduce the rank:
In remaining cases (when F has one of the forms A ∧ B, A ∨ B or A → B) we follow [4] .
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma 6.1.
Comment. Our formulation of the rule (KI 1 ) combines K-introduction with contraction. It is done in order to eliminate the contraction rule and to avoid the case of contraction in the proof of Lemma 6.1. But the contraction rule remains admissible and can be added as a ground rule too, so we can simplify the formulation of the K-introduction rule. It results in a "light" cut-free version IEL G :
A is a variable or ⊥. Rules: Part "if". All missing rules are derivable in IEL G :
Proof. Lemma 6.1 implies the similar statement for the calculus IEL G . Indeed, one can convert IEL G -derivations into IEL Theorem 6.5 The following are equivalent: 
Complexity of IEL
We prove that IEL is PSPACE-complete. The lower bound follows from the same lower bound for the intuitionistic propositional logic. To prove the upper bound we show that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search. Our proof search technique is based on monotone derivations and is similar to one used in [7] . 2 Definition 7.1 For a multiset Γ let set(Γ) be the set of all its members. An instance of a rule 
In (KI W 1 ) we require that the multiset Γ, ∆ 1 does not contain formulas of the form KG. Proof. Consider a derivation which is not monotone. Chose the first nonmonotone instance (R) of a rule in it. (R) introduces a new formula A in the antecedent of its conclusion which is not present in antecedents of some of its premises. Add a copy of A to the antecedent of the conclusion and to antecedents of all sequents above it. When A has the form KB and is added to the antecedent of the conclusion of some instance of rules (KI 1 ) or (KI W 1 ) above (R), add a copy of B to the antecedent of the premise of this rule and to antecedents of all sequents above it. When B has the form KC, do the same with C, etc. Finally, insert the contraction rule after (R):
The result is also a correct derivation with one non-monotone instance eliminated. Repeat the transformation until the derivation becomes monotone. Proof. Given a monotone derivation replace all sequents Γ ′ ⇒ F ′ in it with set(Γ ′ ) ⇒ F ′ . This transformation converts axioms into axioms. We claim that an instance of an inference rule will be converted either into some other instance of a rule of IEL ′ G or some premise of the converted instance will coincide with its conclusion, so the rule can be removed from the resulting proof. The depth of the proof does not increase.
Indeed, instances of (⇒ ∧), (⇒ ∨) and (U ) will be converted into some other instances of the same rule. An instance of (C) will be converted into the trivial rule that can be removed:
The remaining cases. Let k, l, m, n, k
Contractions in antecedents will give
All monotone instances of (∨ ⇒), (∨ C ⇒) have the form
Contractions in antecedents will give The size of a sequent F 1 , . . . , F k ⇒ F is the sum of the lengths of all formulas F i and F . Lemma 7.7 Let M n be the set of all minimal derivations of sequents of size n. There exist polynomials p and q such that for any derivation D ∈ M n , its depth is bounded by p(n) and the sizes of all sequents in D do not exceed q(n).
Proof. Consider a proof tree for some D ∈ M n and a path from the root to some leaf in it:
All sequents in it are distinct from each other, all of them composed of subformulas of the first sequent, ⊥ and K⊥ (Lemma 7.5), and Γ i ⊆ Γ i+1 holds for i < N .
Divide the path into maximal intervals with the same Γ i inside. The length of such interval is bounded by the number of possible formulas F i , which is O(n). The number of intervals is O(n) too, because it does not exceed the maximal length of a strictly monotone sequence ∆ 0 ⊂ ∆ 1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ ∆ k of subsets of S where S is the set of all subformulas of the first sequent extended by ⊥ and K⊥. So, |S| = O(n) and N = O(n 2 ). Any sequent Γ i ⇒ F i consists of at most |S| + 1 formulas of length O(n), so its size is O(n 2 ).
Colorrary 7.8
The set of all IEL ′ G -derivable sequents belongs to PSPACE.
Proof. The result follows from the known game characterization AP = PSPACE ( [5] , see also [8] or [9] ). Let p, q be polynomials from Lemma 7.7. Consider the following two-person game with players (P ) and (V ). The initial configuration b 0 is a sequent of the form set(Γ) ⇒ F of size n. Player (P ) moves the first. He writes down one or two sequents of sizes less than q(n) and his opponent (V ) chooses one of them, and so on. The game is over after p(n) moves of (V ) or when (V ) chooses a sequent that is an axiom of IEL ′ G . Let w i and b i denote the moves of players (P ) and (V ) respectively, so b 0 , w 1 , b 1 , b 2 , w 2 , ... is a run of the game. Player (P ) wins if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. For every move of (P ) the figure
is a monotone instance of some inference rule of IEL ′ G . 2. All sequents written by (P ) have the form set (∆) ⇒ G.
